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In recent years the philosophy of mind has been developed relatively independently 
from the philosophy of language. Only a few decades ago it was quite generally held 
that thought is linguistic: language was supposed to be both a vehicle for thought and 
a means of communication. Due to the rise of cognitive science this idea has been 
abandoned. Thinking in language is now regarded to be only a part of our cognitive 
apparatus. 
 As a result of this development new directions within the philosophy of 
language have been pursued without taking notice of what motivated philosophers to 
study language in the first place. Nowadays semantic theories about language are 
being developed (like Dynamic Predicate Logic) that simply ignore the fact that 
language serves as an expression of thoughts.1 
 There was a time that such a separate development of thought and language 
must have seemed a mystery. In Aristotle’s work it was presupposed that the structure 
of objects in reality was reflected in the structure of assertions about those objects. An 
object has properties and in assertions about that object those properties are being 
assigned to it. The fundamental form of an assertion cannot be anything else for 
Aristotle but ‘Subject is Predicate’, in which ‘is’ functions both as a copula and as the 
carrier of truth or falsity.2 
                                               
1 See f.i. H. Kamp and U. Reyle (1993), chapter 0, J. Groenendijk and M. Stokhof (1991). 
2 See E. Tugendhat [1956] (1982). 
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 Frege’s revolution in logic started from another analysis of the fundamental 
form of an assertion. In an act of assertion, according to Frege, the speaker judges that 
the thought expressed in the assertion is true. Predicates, according to Frege, are 
‘ungesättigt’; so instead of a tripartite analysis of thoughts expressed, we have a 
bipartite.3 However, what Frege shares with Aristotle is an interest in the smallest 
units that can be true or false and that interest is motivated by the philosophical 
question what the relation is between language, thought and reality. 
 Since the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century the Aristotelian 
belief that there is a symmetrical harmony between reality, on the one hand, and 
language and thought, on the other, seemingly has become an untenable assumption. 
A similar assumption with respect to the relation between thought and language, 
however, is still commonplace within the philosophy of mind. Frege’s analysis of 
thoughts into argument (proper names) and function (predicates) has been generally 
adopted as if predicate logic is the logic of the mind. 
 To give a few examples: in Fodor’s language of thought hypothesis, it is 
assumed without argument that the sentences of the language of thought can be 
analysed in terms of Frege’s predicate logic.4 Davidson requires that a theory of 
meaning is compositional and the compositional structure is again that of predicate 
logic, as is the logical form of sentences (and thus of thoughts, given Davidson’s 
views about the relationship between thought and language).5 
                                               
3 G. Frege [1879] (1977), § 9, pp. 15 – 18, G. Frege [1891] (1980), [1904] (1980). 
4 See J. A. Fodor (1975), “What the private language must be like”, pp. 79 – 97. J. A. Fodor (1987), 
“Appendix: Why There Still Has to Be a Language of Thought”, pp. 135 – 154, J. A. Fodor (1994), 
passim, J. A. Fodor (1998), chapter 1, “Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory”, pp. 1 – 
22. 
5 D. Davidson [1970] (1984). 
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 As a result of the widely accepted rejection of the idea that thought is 
linguistic, the Aristotelian assumption that there is a symmetrical harmony between 
thought and language has to be rejected. We then need to know if thoughts are indeed 
structured, and, if so, where the structure of thoughts is derived from.6 Is it from 
another medium, like pictures, or are thoughts intrinsically structured? Some kind of 
justification is required for the structure of thoughts, for it does not seem prima facie 
implausible nor impossible that corresponding to sentences there are unstructured 
thoughts or thoughts with a logical structure far more complicated than that of good 
old predicate logic. In this paper I examine one well-known attempt to justify the 
claim that thoughts are intrinsically structured, Evans’s justification of the Generality 
Constraint. I compare this with a rival account, proposed by Peaocke. I end by 
suggesting that a naïve, Aristotelian realist has no difficulty at all in providing a 
justification of the Generality Constraint, which is therefore a view that deserves 
serious consideration. 
 
I 
 
What could be the starting point for the justification of the claim that thoughts are 
essentially structured? In order to gain more clarity on this question, I have structured 
an informal argument for that conclusion in separate premises. 
 
1. Let us start by saying that what ever else a thought might be, it is the 
smallest unit of content that can be true or false. 
 
                                               
6 For a rejection of the view that thoughts are structured see S. Schiffer (1991). 
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2. A thought about the external world is true, if and only if it describes 
the way the world is. These thoughts are world-directed. 
 
3. In order to have a thought about an object in the world, we need to be 
able to identify and re-identify that object. 
 
4. The notion of re-identification presupposes that we have a conception 
of that object as existing unperceived. 
 
5. When is a thought about an object true? If the object the thought is 
about indeed has the property that it is thought to have. 
 
6. Thus formulated, it seems that to entertain a thought about an object 
involves at least two separate ways of thinking: 
1. We need to be able to think about the object in a particular way 
(as the occupant of a particular place in time and space). 
2. We need to think about that same object as the possessor of a 
particular property (quality). 
 
7. So when can we credit an individual with a true thought about an 
object? At the very least the subject must be able to think about that 
object and be able to identify it, and also must be able to think that it 
has that property. 
 
 5 
 This way of arguing for the claim that thoughts are intrinsically structured is 
basically Strawsonian. Strawson starts from the assumption that “the basic 
combination of subject and predicate” reflects some fundamental features of our 
thought about the world.7 
 
“In any ground-level linguistic expression of a judgement of our fundamental 
type we distinguish three functions: that of specifying the particular(s) 
concerned; that of specifying the general concept concerned (i. e. the general 
concept which the particular(s) is (are) judged to exemplify); and that of 
presenting particular (s) and general concepts as assigned to each other in 
such a way that you have a propositional combination, true if the particular 
(or pair, trio, etc.) exemplifies the concept, false if not.”8 
 
What distinguishes the informal argument cited above from Strawson’s approach, is 
that Strawson explains the structure of thoughts in terms of the structure of sentences 
that express these thoughts. As is well known, Evans has reversed this order of 
explanation in The Varieties of Reference, by interpreting Frege’s notion of sense as a 
way of thinking about the reference.9 
 The reversal of the order of explanation implies, of course, that “the essential 
combination” of subject and predicate in linguistic propositions needs to be explained 
in terms of the structure of the thoughts that are expressed in these propositions. For 
this purpose Evans introduces his by now famous Generality Constraint. 
 
“[…], if a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must 
have the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for 
every property of being G of which he has a conception.”10 
 
                                               
7 P. F. Strawson (1959), Part II, P. F. Strawson (1971), and P. F. Strawson (1974). 
8 P. F. Strawson (1974), p. 22. 
9 G. R. Evans (1982), chapter 1: “Frege”. 
10 G. R. Evans (1982), p. 104. 
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The Generality Constraint plays a crucial role in Evans’s justification for the claim 
that thoughts are structured as can be seen from the following quote. Evans writes: 
 
“With the Generality Constraint in mind, we may take a small step from our 
truistic starting-point, and say that in the case of a proposition of the form ‘a 
is F’, knowledge of what it is for it to be true must be the result of two pieces 
of knowledge, one of which can be equated with an Idea of an object, and the 
other with an Idea of property, or more familiarly, a concept. […] An Idea of 
an object is part of a conception of a world of such objects, distinguished 
from one another in certain fundamental ways. For every kind of object, 
there is a general answer to the question ‘What makes it the case that there 
are two objects of this kind rather than one (or three rather than two)?’”11 
 
 At this point we are in the following position. The claim that thoughts are 
essentially structured is based on the Generality Constraint. So if we want to justify 
that thoughts are essentially structured, we need a justification for the Generality 
Constraint. If the Generality Constraint can be justified, we have all that is required 
for the claim that thoughts are essentially structured. 
 Evans’s justification of the Generality Constraint employs as crucial notions 
that of ‘the fundamental ground of difference of an object’ and that of a ‘fundamental 
Idea of an object’. These ideas are grounded in Wiggins’s sortal theory of identity.12 
An idea of an object is part of a conception of a world of such objects, distinguished 
from one another in certain fundamental ways. The most fundamental way that 
distinguishes an object from others is the fundamental ground of difference of that 
object. This fundamental ground of difference is a specific answer to the question 
what differentiates this object from all other objects. A subject possesses a 
fundamental idea of an object, if he thinks of it as the possessor of the fundamental 
ground of difference that it in fact possesses. 
                                               
11 G. R. Evans (1982), p. 106. 
12 D. Wiggins (1980) and (2001). I return to this influence below. 
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 Given this explanation of what a fundamental idea is, Evans clearly 
presupposes that objects that can be differentiated from one another in one and only 
one fundamental way inhabit the world. He, therefore, does presuppose that there is a 
ready made world out there and his justification is therefore a realist one. However, 
Evans inherits from Wiggins and Strawson a version of realism that could be called 
‘conceptual realism’. It starts from the assumption that we possess thoughts and then 
proceeds by inquiring what the pre-conditions are for being able to possess thoughts 
about a mind-independent reality. Evans then justifies the Generality Constraint, the 
claim that thoughts are essentially structured, by considering thoughts about objects. 
But given his starting point from within the realm of thoughts, one could very well 
question why we ought to base the justification of the Generality Constraint on 
thoughts about objects. For, so one could claim, all our thoughts are structured, not 
just thoughts about objects. So either one ought to assign a conceptual priority to 
thoughts about objects or else the justification of the Generality Constraint should not 
be based on a fundamental level of thinking about objects. Peacocke chooses to 
follow the second route. 
II 
 
Peacocke has criticised Evans’s approach, because it presupposes a questionable theory 
of identity.13 His own justification of the Generality Constraint is given in terms of the 
notion of ‘knowing what it is for’. This notion is embedded in his theory of concepts. 
According to Peacocke a thought is individuated by possession conditions for its 
constituents, concepts. Those possession conditions state what conditions a thinker 
must meet in order to be credited with the possession of that particular concept. It has 
                                               
13 C. Peacocke (1992), “Appendix B: Evans’s derivation of the Generality Constraint: A Comparison”, 
pp. 231 – 235. 
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to be supplemented with an account of how concepts are combined in complete 
thoughts. Peacocke’s account starts with Frege’s dictum that sense determines 
reference. He uses this very requirement to explain how concepts are combined in one 
thought. The requirement, in his words, is: 
 
“Possessing a concept is knowing what it is for something to be its semantic 
value.”14 
 
The fact that concepts possess a semantic value explains how the truth-value is 
determined of a thought that is the result of combining two concepts. 
Peacocke justifies the Generality Constraint by providing a Referential 
Explanation. This justification starts from two premises. The first is that attitudes are 
relations to complex contents, composed in a distinctive way from concepts possessed 
by the thinker. The second premise is that possessing a concept is knowing what it is 
for something to be its semantic value. 
 Armed with these premises we need to explain what it is for a thinker who has 
the thought Fa and the singular mode of presentation b to know what it is for the thought 
Fb to be true. If a thinker is capable of entertaining the thought Fa, then he has to know 
three things. First, he has to know, since he possesses the concept a, what it is for an 
arbitrary object to be the semantic value of a. Secondly, since he possesses the concept 
F, he must know what is for an arbitrary object to be the semantic value of F. Thirdly, 
he must be able to grasp the semantic significance of the mode of combination of F and 
a. 
 If a thinker possesses the concept b, he similarly has to know what it is for an 
arbitrary object to be the semantic value of b. Since the possession of any concept 
requires that a subject has the capacity to entertain propositional attitudes towards 
contents containing that concept, the subject also knows what it is to judge Fb. If he 
judges Fb, then he eo ipso aims at the truth, when judging Fb. If he is able to aim at the 
                                               
14 C. Peacocke (1992), p. 43. 
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truth when judging Fb, he must also be able to grasp the semantic significance of the 
mode of combination of F and b. In that case we cannot but conclude that the subject 
knows everything that is required for knowing what it is for the thought Fb to be true, 
so we have justified the Generality Constraint.15 
 Peacocke’s justification of the Generality Constraint is very abstract. This has 
two consequences. The first is a virtue, because the account is applicable not only to 
the name/bearer relation in the case of observable, concrete objects, but also to abstract 
and microscopic objects, and also, his own example, moments in time. It thus avoids 
the problems Evans’s account faces as a result of introducing the notion of a 
fundamental level of thought.  
 Peacocke does have a point: why should we require, as Evans does, that our 
thoughts necessarily involve knowing the fundamental ground of difference of objects? 
Do we really need to know to what ultimate sortal an object belongs to in order to be 
able to identify and re-identify that object? 
 It is instructive to try to reconstruct why Evans felt that thoughts have to be 
fundamental in order to be objective. The introduction of the Generality Constraint 
occurs in a chapter that is also a direct polemic with Dummett. As is well known 
Dummett accused semantic realists of employing a verification transcendent notion of 
truth in their theory of meaning. Consequently, according to Dummett, semantic 
realists cannot give a satisfactory account of how we manifest in pour linguistic 
behaviour knowledge of the meaning of many sentences.16 
 Evans attempts to defend the realist’s contention that we possess a verification 
transcendent notion of truth. Such a notion involves an absolute conception of the word. 
In such an absolute conception of the world each object possesses its fundamental 
ground of difference. Evans thus seems to have been motivated by the realist’s craving 
for objectivity, but from within the realm of thoughts. But why couldn’t a realist just 
start with the assumption that there is world out there inhabited by structured entities? 
                                               
15 Cf. C. Peacocke (1992) (a), p. 43 - 44. 
16 M. Dummett [1976] (1993). R. Garrett Millikan (2000), pp. 180 – 184, makes a similar point. 
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 This question brings us to the second consequence. Since Peacocke intends his 
account to remain neutral about the external world, he needs to provide us with an 
explanation of how we acquire the capacity to know what it is for something to be 
semantic value of a concept.17 But that he does not provide. It is difficult to see how 
this can be achieved without presupposing the prototype situation of the referential 
name/bearer relation: names for observable entities. And indeed Peacocke suggests as 
much: 
 
“Some of the possession conditions presented earlier have a clause with the 
property that judging in accordance with that clause requires, in the most basic 
case, making  a fundamental identification of the object of predication. […] 
Judging in accordance with that clause involves identifying the object of 
predication in a perceptual-demonstrative way. In the most basic case, this 
provides an egocentric identification of the location of the object at the time 
of the judgement. I also emphasized in earlier chapters that the other clauses 
of these possession conditions ride on the back of the perceptual clause: these 
other clauses make reference to experiences of the sort mentioned in the 
perceptual case, but not vice versa.”18 
 
If perceptual concepts are the most basic concepts of our conceptual repertoire, then 
we expect that to be reflected in an account of the structure of thoughts, not just in a 
clause, but centrally in the framework of the explanation, unless we are being given 
very good reasons to give up that expectation. 
 
 
III 
 
As we saw in the previous section Peacocke questioned whether a fundamental level of 
thought is required in order to be able to credit someone with the capacity of referring 
                                               
17 That Peacocke intends his Referential Explanation of the Generality Constraint to be abstract is 
illustrated by the following quote: “[…] the Referential Explanation is independent of the kind of 
object referred to by the concepts quantified over in the constraint. It is of equal application to thoughts 
about material objects, numbers, sets, mental events, or anything else. As far as the explanation of the 
constraint is concerned, no subject matter has any explanatory priority.” C. Peacocke (1992), p. 44. 
18 C. Peacocke (1992), p. 233. 
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and thinking about an object. We do not need a fundamental, sortal concept in order to 
be able to refer and think about an object. He provided an alternative justification of 
the Generality Constraint that did not require a fundamental level of thought. However, 
his account became so abstract that it did not pay justice to the fact that our basic 
thoughts are intimately tied with our perceptions; it treated that fact as a mere 
afterthought. So the challenge that we now face is to come up with an explanation of 
the structure of thoughts that respects that thought and perception are inextricably 
linked without invoking the notion of a fundamental level of thought in the way Evans 
proposed. 
 In order to develop such an alternative, let us return to the informal argument 
for the Generality Constraint given above. The first premise in that argument was the 
following: 
 
1. Let us start by saying that what ever else a thought might be, it is the 
smallest unit of content that can be true or false. 
This premise might be true, but it invites the question whether thoughts are the only 
contents that can be true or false. The answer is that they are not, since there are other 
contents like perceptual contents, that can be true of false as well.19 Let us focus on 
perceptual content. In perception objects are presented to us. It is the means through 
which our thought is connected with the world. We perceive objects that are presented 
to us in perception.20 This brings us to the second premise of the informal argument. 
 
2. A thought about the external world is true, if and only if it describes the 
way the world is. These thoughts are world-directed. 
The crucial notion in this premise is that of ‘world directedness’. Is the ‘world 
directedness’ of thoughts the same as that of perception? The answer is that it is not. 
                                               
19 See a. o. T. Crane (1992). 
20 A point also stressed by A. Clark (2000), p. 115. 
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The aboutness of perception requires an ongoing flow of information; the aboutness of 
thoughts does not. As Austen Clark has put it: “The ‘ofness’ of sensation is not the 
‘ofness’ of thought.”21 
 This claim raises the question which of the two is the more fundamental notion. 
From the seventeenth century onwards the mainstream answer has been that only 
conceptual content has intentional content, which implies that experience, if is about 
anything, has to be conceptual, an implication embraced by philosophers as diverse as 
Kant, Quine and McDowell. As is well known, this position has been challenged on the 
basis of the following arguments, which I repeat below, because I want to connect them 
with the justification of the Generality Constraint. 
 The main arguments are the following: 
 
1. One should not confuse the content of a perceptual experience with a 
description of that content, just like one should not confuse an object with 
a description of that object.22 
 
2. An indication of the truth of 1) is the observation that contents of 
experiences are more finely grained than the concepts possessed by the 
experiencer.23 
 
3. A further indication of the truth of 1) is that perceptions are resilient to 
conclusive counterevidence which forces us to acknowledge that they are 
not beliefs.24 
 
                                               
21 See A. Clark (2000), p. 115. 
22 M. R. Ayers (2004), pp. 250 – 251. 
23 C. A. B. Peacocke (1992), p. 67.  
24 G. R. Evans (1982), pp. 123 – 124, T. Crane (1992). 
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4. Perceptual content is a more primitive notion than that of conceptual 
content. We share it with animals and children.25 
 
If these arguments are convincing, some obvious consequences for an account of 
thought follow. For we now have to say that “the propositional account of non-
propositional content is based or grounded on that content, not simply caused by it. It 
has to be so grounded, in order to be an account of the thing of which it is an account. 
The cause of a description is not thereby its object. The object of a non-accidentally 
true description has both to cause and ground it.”26 
 This view is supported by an argument to the effect that a more primitive level 
of thought makes demonstrative thoughts about objects possible.27 Knowledge of 
reference is thus based on acquaintance with the object, on conscious attention to an 
object. 
 Campbell writes: 
 
“Our grasp of the identity conditions of an object over time, or the boundaries 
of the object at a time, is grounded not in grasp of sortal concepts, but in the 
style of conscious attention we pay to the thing. And conscious attention to the 
object does not have to be focused by a grasp of sortal concepts; the various 
styles of conscious attention of which we are capable do not rely on our use of 
sortal concepts. Grasp of sortal concepts is a more sophisticated matter than 
the phenomena of reference and conscious attention.”28 
 
If that is correct, the implications for the justification of the Generality Constraint in 
terms of sortal concepts or fundamental Ideas at the fundamental level of thought are 
far reaching. For such a justification just seems to demand too much sophistication on 
the part of the thinker, than seems required for the ability to entertain structured 
thoughts. Campbell concludes: “It seems evident that we cannot sustain this conception 
of a level of thought, more fundamental than the level of perceptual demonstratives, at 
                                               
25 F. i. C. McGinn (1989), p. 62. 
26 M. R. Ayers (2004), p. 251. 
27 J. Campbell (2002). 
28 J. Campbell (2002), p. 83. 
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which predicates of physical things are first introduced and explained.”29 However, he 
does not explicitly draw the obvious conclusion from his own argument that Evans’s 
justification of the Generality Constraint fails for the very reason that such a 
fundamental level of thought cannot be sustained, although it is implied by what he 
writes. 
 The reason that Evans’s justification of the Generality Constraint fails is thus 
his adherence to a fundamental level of thought. As mentioned above, what seems to 
have motivated Evans to adopt it is a vestige of conceptualism, probably under the 
influence of Wiggins. In Sameness and Substance the latter defends a sortal theory of 
identity according to which every object is individuated by the fact that it belongs to a 
natural kind and occupies a certain position in space and time. Indeed, exactly the 
criteria an idea of an object has to satisfy in order to qualify as a fundamental Idea of 
that object. In the course of expounding his views Wiggins defends the thesis that 
realism and conceptualism are compatible; in a later essay supported by referring to 
Leibniz: 
 
“In Leibniz’s account of ordinary human knowledge, a clear idea of horse 
is not an image or a likeness of horse. It is that by the possession of which 
I recognize a horse when I encounter one. [...] A clear idea of horse is 
confused (or non-distinct) if, even though I can recognize a horse when I 
encounter one, I cannot enumerate one by one the marks which are 
sufficient to distinguish that kind of thing from another kind of thing. My 
understanding is simply practical and deictic. What I possess here I 
possess simply by having been brought into the presence of the thing. [...] 
Our idea of horse will begin to become distinct as we learn to enumerate 
the marks that flow from the nature of a horse and that distinguishes a 
horse form other creatures.”30 
 
Conceptual realism thus requires an active role of concepts in the identification of 
concepts, and at the same time demands a contribution of the object to be identified in 
that process. Wiggins emphasizes that duality: 
                                               
29 J. Campbell (2002), pp. 109 – 113. 
30 D. Wiggins (1994), p. 213. 
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“[…] the object is there anyway, even if it took a particular sort of empirically 
and logically constrained looking to light up there. The mind conceptualizes 
an object that is there to be conceptualized, even as the object impinges upon 
the mind that has the right thought to single out that object.”31 
 
Evans has not adopted Wiggins’s terminology, but the framework of conceptual 
realism is clearly visible in his account of an information-based particular thought about 
an object. Such a thought involves a duality of factors: 
 
“[…] on the one hand, the subject’s possession of information derived from an 
object, which he regards as germane to the evaluation and appreciation of the 
thought; and on the other hand, the subject’s satisfaction of the requirement 
imposed by Russell’s Principle – his identification of the object which his 
thought concerns.”32 
 
So even though Evans’s work provided many of the ingredients that enabled 
philosophers to develop theories about non-conceptual content, in his own work that 
notion mainly played a role in a causal explanation of how we are able to locate an 
object belonging to a particular natural kind in space and time of which we already 
possess a conception, thus essentially remaining faithful to conceptual realism. 
 If what has motivated Evans to introduce the notion of a fundamental level of 
thought is no longer credible, then there is less urgency to defend it on independent 
grounds. And if the arguments against a fundamental level of thought are convincing, 
then we need an alternative justification for the Generality Constraint and for the idea 
that thoughts are structured. In earlier work Campbell has provided an alternative 
account of why thoughts are structured.33 However, his own recent work suggests yet 
another alternative. 
 Campbell argues at some length that conscious attention to an object unites the 
different features our senses register as coming from one location. Conscious attention 
                                               
31 D. Wiggins (1986), p. 180. 
32 G. R. Evans (1982), p. 138. 
33 J. Campbell (1986). 
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thus presents an object as a material unity with different qualities to our thinking. 
Subsequently we can apply concepts to that object and refer to it. 
 It could be objected that this account focuses on perceptual identification and 
that an account and an explanation of reference ought to be more general, as Peacocke 
argues. But there is a simple rebuttal of this objection (already mentioned in the above): 
the notion of reference is acquired by the prototype of the reference relation, which is 
the name/bearer relation. Even the most prominent anti-realist has to resort to the 
standard situation of referring to medium shaped size objects in order to explain what 
reference is.34 That means that there is conceptual asymmetry between the concept of 
reference when applied to medium-sized objects and the concept of reference when it 
is used for referring to, for instance, deceased or abstract objects, in the following sense: 
that the notion of reference when applied in the case of terms for abstract objects is 
explained in terms of reference to concrete medium-sized objects, but not vice versa.35 
 The question of what justifies this conceptual asymmetry then arises, and the 
answer surely must be that our notion of reference is based on a realist conception of 
the world around us. So we can derive from Dummett’s remark the following 
transcendental argument: 
 
1. We possess a notion of (successful) reference. 
2. A precondition for the possibility of possessing the notion of referring to 
objects, is that we are able to refer to medium sized objects in our vicinity. 
3. Therefore: we are able to refer to medium sized objects in our vicinity. 
 
The decidability of the reference relation thus requires us to acknowledge the existence 
of medium sized objects. The question then arises what explains our capacity to refer 
successfully to these objects and the answer must be: through experience. In 
Campbell’s words: “concepts of individual physical objects, and concepts of the 
                                               
34 M. Dummett (1973), several places, f. i. pp. 406 – 408. 
35 As Peacocke also suggests in the passage quoted above from his (1992), p. 233. 
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observable characteristics of such objects, are made available by our experience of the 
world. It is experience of the world that explains our grasp of these concepts.”36 
 The explanatory role experience plays is that knowledge of reference of a term 
in the prototype situation (for instance, when a person is introduced to a hearer by a 
speaker with a phrase like: “This is Miss so and so”) demands an ability to locate the 
object referred to. The ability to locate that object involves the binding of features 
located at the place occupied by the object and registered by our senses and our 
informational systems. 
 Thus described, the ability to locate an object that enables a thinker to describe 
whether his or her reference to an object has been successful involves a capacity to 
unite different features into a single object. This cognitive capacity of binding features 
ought to be distinguished from the capacity to make a distinction between features and 
the thing they are features of. It is a more primitive capacity than the capacity to 
predicate, yet is crucial for an account of the structure of thoughts. 
 The argument for the claim that thoughts are structured now proceeds as 
follows. The first step is to accept that we have to assign conceptual priority to 
name/bearer relation in the case of middle-sized objects. That is the prototype situation 
in which we acquire the notion of reference. 
 Secondly, in that prototype situation a thinker has a thought about that middle-
sized object in front of him or her. That thought is true, if and only if the object the 
thought is about indeed has the property the thought assign to it. 
 Traditionally, the explanation of how thoughts were verified followed the 
Fregean model. “The two anchors of Frege’s semantics” are truth and reference.37 The 
relationship between truth and reference was thought to be reciprocal. Only if the 
proper name successfully refers to an object, can the question whether the thought is 
true arise. Conversely, asking whether the thought is true, forces a thinker to find out 
whether the proper name refers. 
                                               
36 J. Campbell (2002), p. 128. 
37 The phrase “The two anchors of Frege’s semantics” is Evans’s. See G. R. Evans (1982), p. 9. 
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 Campbell’s explanation of knowledge of reference demands a modification of 
Frege’s model. Knowledge of reference ought to be distinguished from finding out 
whether a demonstrative or a proper name occurring in a thought refers. The 
identification of the object is more fundamental than its re-identification and 
recognition. We first have to lower the first anchor, reference, and then we can start to 
entertain thoughts about the object. Thoughts require pre-predicative experience.38 
 Campbell argues convincingly that we ought to distinguish between 
 
(1) Using an object’s possession of a property to single it out visually,  
 
and 
 
(2) Verifying a proposition to the effect that the object has that property.39 
 
The first is a pre-conceptual cognitive activity, the second a conceptual one. The 
distinction between these two cognitive activities thus explains that thoughts are 
structured, much in the way as Aristotle suggested: there is something immediately 
present in front of us (hypokeimenon) that has certain properties. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
After the linguistic turn in philosophy the structure of thoughts could be explained and 
derived from the structure of sentences. Now philosophy has taken a cognitive turn this 
view can no longer be sustained. I have examined attempts to justify the structure and 
compositionality of thoughts that take as their point of departure the so-called 
Generality Constraint. Evans’ s account, which has been the first attempt, failed 
                                               
38 Cf. E. Husserl[1939] (1985), Abschnitt I. 
39 J. Campbell (2002), pp. 28 – 34. 
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because it relied on the notion of a fundamental level of thought, which is too 
demanding. First, since its explanans seems more sophisticated than the explanandum, 
the capacity to entertain structured thoughts. Secondly, because it is incapable to 
account for the structure of many thoughts that do not involve a fundamental way of 
thinking, yet are clearly structured. 
 I then examined Peacocke’s justification. Although in many ways congenial to 
the spirit of the proposal I favour, I concluded that its main structure, based on the 
notion of ‘knowing what it is for’, is too abstract, in particular because it does not assign 
a central role to perception, although Peacocke states that this is the basic case. 
 In Campbell’s account of knowledge of reference perception is treated as being 
fundamental for the ability and the development of conceptual thoughts. He treats 
knowledge of reference as a pre-conceptual cognitive capacity that enables us to 
entertain thoughts about objects presented to us in perception. 
 If that is correct, it is a return to Aristotle in at least this respect, that there is 
some kind of harmony between thought and reality after all. In that case an extremely 
straightforward justification of the Generality Constraint and the structure of thoughts 
presents itself: it is simply that the structure of thoughts mirrors the structure of reality. 
There is simply no other way to think about reality. 
 
Menno Lievers. 
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